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AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF FAIR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE FTAA
IS AN ENFORCEABLE SOCIAL CLAUSE
Terry Collingsworth*
L The Justification for a Social Clause
Multinational companies (CMNCs") and governments that are fantasizing
about a Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA") should accept the reality that the
FTAA is not politically viable for the time being unless the issues of labor rights and
other social conditions are addressed in a manner demonstrating that these rights are
consistent with the commercial rights that are protected in careful detail in the many
pages of the draft FTAA agreement. The rage expressed by protestors in Seattle,
Quebec, Genoa and Washington, D.C., although extreme, illustrates the united belief
that the global economy is out of balance. There is no principled reason for trade
agreements that ensure the intellectual property contained in a compact disc is strictly
protected against piracy, while pirates of a different sort can violate international norms
relating to labor rights and the environment in the production of those discs. Not even
the overused cry of "free trade" excuses the imbalance that results in hundreds of
pages in the World Trade Organization ("WTO") agreement devoted to regulation of
commercial trade rules, but refuses to include labor or environmental rules, finding such
social regulations to infringe upon doctrinal purity.
Those opposing the FTAA span the spectrum from groups that favor trade
agreements, but only if they contain a social clause that targets the working poor as
beneficiaries of trade,' to groups that oppose trade period, whether they are Luddites
or protectionists. Former President Clinton could not scrape together a bare majority
in 1998 to give him "fast track" authority to negotiate the FTAA, and lost a decisive
vote in the Congress. President Bush is hoping that the public will be fooled into
thinking that the "Trade Promotion Authority" he is now seeking is different from fast
track, but the organized opposition views the name change as a superficial and
provocative stunt. Whatever the name, it is unlikely that the Bush Administration will
succeed where Clinton failed in attracting votes from moderate to liberal Democrats to
support the FTAA, let alone the conservatives in his own party.
The deadlock will only be broken by fundamental change in the perception of
what trade is and what it should do. Improving social standards should be the
paramount goal of trade and other commercial exchanges, not an eventual side effect.
By favoring trade agreements that heavily regulate the commercial rules and by
* Terry Collingsworth is a labor and human rights attorney specializing in trade and
international labor rights issues. He has been General Counsel of the Washington-
based International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) since 1989. At ILRF, he directs litigation,
develops legislative proposals to regulate labor rights in the global economy, builds
coalitions to address human rights and labor rights issues in the international arena,
and researches conditions for workers in developing countries.
1 See, e.g., Hemispheric Social Alliance, Alternatives for the Americas, at http://www.asc-
hsa.org. (Apr. 2001).
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hypocritically opposing regulations that address social issues, the free traders are
essentially recycling the failed theory of "trickle down" economics. Their theory is that
by freeing up business to make money, everyone, including the poor, will benefit. A
trip to the Maquiladoras at the US -Mexican border, or worse, the garment sweatshops
of Honduras, offers compelling evidence that this theory is no more viable than when
Herbert Hoover espoused it shortly before the Great Depression. There is no question
that the global economy has failed to deliver goods to the working poor, and the
quality of life for the large population of working poor is little more than a blip on a
graph of macroeconomic indicators. Trickle down economics is even less likely to work
in a global, as opposed to national, context because employers become less
accountable to their workers and to any particular nation as they globalize. Developing
countries are forced to compete against one another to attract new investment by
offering cheap labor and lax enforcement of laws.2 This downward spiral of reverse
development lowers living standards for all workers and sends higher profits back to
the MNCs, based largely in Europe, the United States and Japan.
An alternative economic vision of trade is that it can be used to provide an
opportunity to create better jobs for the working poor in developing countries.
Improving the economic situation for these people ought to be the precondition for
trade, rather than hoping (against all objective measures of reality) that increased trade
might help these target groups through some long-term trickle-down process.
Individual nations have differing economic conditions and some nations have a
legitimate comparative advantage of relatively cheap and plentiful labor. However, this
advantage does not conceptually preclude the requirement in a trade agreement, such
as the FTAA, that participating nations agree to abide by a set of core labor rights that
set a floor from which each nation can seek to improve upon. This would stop the
downward spiral, and would make clear that the objective of increased trade and
economic development is to make progress for the workers of each country. Moreover,
a global floor for labor standards would mean that there can be no country where a
company could flee in order to avoid compliance. Rather than making cheap labor a
major criteria for investment, employers would have a greater incentive to focus on
training workers to improve productivity.
Similar policies favor including environmental provisions in trade agreements
to form an overall social clause.3 If trade is to be a vehicle for improving living
standards for those struggling to survive in developing countries, then a key aspect
of managing trade should be to prevent exposing people to hazardous chemicals and
to protect against environmental degradation. There is no principled justification for
MNCs that have left a developed country to engage in offshore manufacturing to use
chemicals or allow other forms of pollution that are prohibited in their home countries.
Without enforceable standards in trade agreements, developing countries will be
2 This is not unlike the situation in the United States prior to the enactment of the New
Deal legislation. Southern states were largely nonunion and offered cheaper labor than
the relatively industrialized Northeast. The garment and textile industries in particular
began to shift south. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
(1994), by creating a minimum wage, regulating hours and working conditions, provided
the floor of minimum standards nationally that thereafter prevented the states from
competing with one another based on cheap labor and long hours.
3 See, e.g., supra note 1.
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inviting disaster if MNCs are free to seek manufacturing locations where they can turn
back the clock and pollute without regard to the health or safety of workers and
neighboring communities.
The remainder of this paper will focus on the substance of a labor clause, and
more importantly, on an enforcement mechanism. The overall concept, particularly with
regard to enforcement, would be equally applicable to an environmental clause or other
social standards.
IL The Substance of a Labor Clause
The most fundamental concept at the forefront of efforts to gain acceptance
of an enforceable labor clause is that most countries in the world, and certainly those
that would be in the FTAA, have domestic labor laws and have ratified international
instruments, including International Labor Organization ('ILO") Conventions, that
already require compliance with all of the terms of a reasonable labor clause. 4 What is
lacking is not only a clear consensus on the terms of the clause, but more importantly,
a mechanism to ensure adequate enforcement for labor laws. While unions and Non-
Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") continue to have their territorial battles within
and across national boundaries, the MNCs are united in their global vision to protect
property and investments. This is evidenced quite dramatically by the success of
highly-competitive technology firms cooperating for their mutual interest to secure the
inclusion of very strict rules to protect intellectual property rights in the last General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") round creating the World Trade
Organization ("WTO'T and in the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 6
In sharp contrast, labor and human rights organizations have failed to achieve
inclusion of a binding labor clause in these trade agreements. A labor clause to benefit
all workers in the global economy will only be achieved through solidarity and united
action.
There has been progress of late concerning the substance of the proposed
labor clause. The most widely-accepted version of the labor clause was proposed by
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions C'ICFrL'), the international body
of national trade union federations. The ICFTU's proposal defines the social clause
based on key Conventions of the ILO, which have been ratified by most countries of
the world. These include:
the right to associate (ILO Convention No. 87);
4 The Southern Cone trade unions made this a primary argument for uniform labor
standards and documented the ILO Conventions that had been ratified by all of the
countries participating in Mercosur. With respect to the potential countries of the
FTAA, the United States has not ratified most of the ILO Conventions, but generally
has domestic labor laws which, if enforced, would satisfy most of the key Conventions.
For a list of ILO Convention ratifications by country, see Lists of Ratifications by
Convention and by County, ILO Doc. Rep. 111/5 (1995). A list of ratifications by the
countries of the Americas is located in the Appendix.
' Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade
Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1, 81 (1994).
6 North American Free Trade Agreement, openedfor signature Dec. 8, 1992, pt. VI, ch. 17,
32 I.L.M. 605, 670 (1993).
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* the right to organize and bargain collectively (ILO Convention No.
98);
* equal employment opportunity and non-discrimination (ILO
Convention Nos. 100 and 11);
* Prohibition of Forced Labor (ILO Convention Nos. 29 and 105); and
* Prohibition of Child Labor (ILO Convention No. 138).'
This version of the labor clause is endorsed by most of the International Trade
Secretariats. Also, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") has specifically endorsed a virtually identical version of the clause.8
Other suggested additions to a labor clause include minimum standards for
health and safety, and an acceptable minimum wage based on the level of economic
development of a particular country.9 At a people's forum, which was convened in
Brazil in May 1997 to discuss the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), there was an extraordinary showing of unity between unions andNGOs. This
unity resulted in a broad declaration supporting a social clause encompassing more
than core labor rights.0 Whether to have a broad or narrow clause remains a strategic
choice. It must be noted, however, that the chances of achieving the reality of an
enforceable social clause decline as the list of issues covered increase. Governments
and companies will unite to resist any comprehensive regulation. At the same time, the
coalition for supporting the clause grows as new issues are introduced.
Perhaps the most fruitful approach would be to first agree on the components
of the social clause, and then to engage in a prioritization process to phase in the list
of rights across several years. As part of this discussion, development aid and debt
reduction could be used to offset the costs incurred by a developing country as it
phases in the rights of the social clause. The European Union used a similar phase in
approach with its Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") program, first activating
prohibitions on forced or child labor, and then gradually phasing in other core labor
rights. It makes sound strategic sense to focus first on a labor clause that incorporates
existing legal norms and tries to improve enforcement mechanisms. If countries must
initially make major changes in their laws to participate, they will have a significant
incentive to resist. In contrast, it will be difficult to mount a persuasive argument to
resist acceptance of a labor clause that initially binds countries to their existing labor
laws and to international obligations that they have already undertaken.
I A Proposal to Enforce the Terms of a Social Clause
A labor clause, regardless of what the specific terms ultimately are, will make
a concrete improvement in the lives of working people in the global economy only if
there is an effective enforcement mechanism. It is essential to note, however, that an
enforceable labor clause is not a panacea; trade agreements themselves should reflect
a primary concern with improving the lives of people and protecting the environment."
7 See, e.g., Social Charter for Democratic Development, ICFTU-APRO (1994).
8 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., TRADE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR
STANDARDS. A STUDY OF CORE W ORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996).
9 See, eg., George E. Brown et al., Making Trade Fair, 9 W ORLD POL'Y J. 309, 325-26 (1992).
10 See Building a Hemispheric Social Alliance to Confront Free Trade para. 1, at
http://www.developmentgap.org/beloeng.html (May 15, 1997).
"-A Just and Sustainable Trade and Development Initiative for the Western Hemisphere
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A trade agreement that has an enforceable mechanism for seeking redress will not lead
to sustainable development if, at the same time, it permits widespread exploitation of
workers and the environment.
The discussion that follows is intended to raise the key issues that must be
addressed in developing an enforcement mechanism. All of the elements discussed
below are essential, but there are several options for achieving the objective of a given
element. Those choices must be resolved as part of an overall political strategy, and
are highlighted here to facilitate discussion. Sample language is offered in discussing
some elements in order to better illustrate the concept.
A. Compliance with the social clause as a condition to participation
in the FITAA.
A firm principle must be that all countries seeking to participate in the FTAA
must be in compliance with the labor clause as a condition for membership. Each
country would participate in an extensive review of its law and practice to determine
compliance with the standard. If a country is found not to be in complete compliance,
it could have probationary membership, provided it agrees to implement specific
reforms within a specified number of years, subject to ongoing monitoring. The
necessary revisions to law and practice could be identified as part of the harmonization
process discussed in the next section. If at the end of the probationary period a
country fails to be in complete compliance, then its membership in the FTAA would be
terminated with the right to reapply only when there is complete compliance with the
labor clause.
Issues to be Resolved:
1. Who determines conpiance with the labor clause?
Ideally, this would be something the ILO could do. Certainly, in the context
of an agreed format by the participating nations, the ILO is well-suited to assessing
whether any given country is in compliance with core ILO Conventions. Indeed, the
ILO already performs this function to a certain degree through its annual review of
members' compliance with ratified conventions.1 2 Further, when there are persistent
problems with a particular country's compliance with one or more conventions, there
is a procedure to create a Commission of Inquiry to investigate fully.13 The ILO thus
has the experience and mandate to perform this function) 4 If, however, the ILO
declines to participate, or the process for getting its cooperation is too cumbersome,
or, as some assert, the ILO is too lethargic to play a constructive role in international
workers' rights enforcement, then the FTAA could allow for the creation of a panel of
Alliance for Responsible Trade, Citizen Trade Campaign, and the Mexican Action
Network on Free Trade (July 19, 1994).12 Art. 22, Constitution of the ILO (May, 1989).
13Id. at art. 26.
14 Steve Charnovitz, Trade Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent
Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J. at
160-63 (1997) (discussing the ILO's unique qualification to assess compliance with its
Conventions).
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experts to make these determinations. 5 The current draft FTAA follows this format
with respect to disputes between countries relating to commercial issues. There is no
reason why other panels could not be formed with expertise in labor issues. The panels
could be drawn from a balance of labor ministry staff from the participating countries
and outside experts, or, as was agreed to in the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC"), could be made up entirely of credible, outside experts.6
Likewise, trade unions participating in Mercosur have proposed using a "Committee
of Specialists" to evaluate compliance with social standards. Regardless of the
composition of the panel, for purposes of discussion it will be referred to as the "Panel
of Experts."17
2. Can a coutry not in conolixne partic#7ate in the FTAA on aprobaioney basis
while inpwlnetg aplan to be n compliance?
To encourage participation, there should be a reasonable probation period of
about two years to comply with the standard of the labor clause. The reason for this
recommendation is simply to acknowledge the reality that most countries will not be in
complete compliance, and allowing a probationary period will provide some incentive
to make progress in this area. This represents the benefit that trade agreements, like
the FTAA, provide for an opportunity to make progress on workers' rights. If the
barrier for participation is too high, then the result will be no trade agreements and no
opportunities to make progress. Assuming this approach is accepted, then the Panel
of Experts should draft a very specific work plan, including recommendations for reform
of labor laws and improving enforcement mechanisms, to bring a country into
compliance with the labor clause. It should be made clear that the failure of a country
to comply with implementation of a plan within the probation period will result in
automatic expulsion and the option of reapplying only when there is total compliance.
No country will take its obligation seriously if there is a regular pattern of extending
time.
B. Participation in a process to harmonize laws upwardly to be consistent with
the labor clause.
The premise of the labor clause is that at least one or more of the countries
participating in the FTAA either does not have adequate laws or is not enforcing its
laws. Otherwise, a labor clause would not be necessary. In order to emphasize that
individual countries maintain primary responsibility for ensuring the conditions of the
labor clause to allow for unique national solutions, and to avoid creating new
multilateral institutions that exist in perpetuity, a process of upward harmonization is
15 Further concerns are whether the ILO could in fact perform all of the functions
required in enforcing the social clause and whether giving the ILO enforcement powers
would cause employer and government representatives to take concerted action to
dilute the standards set by the Conventions, which to date have been more viewed as
of academic interest since there is no threat of enforcement.
16See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 9, 1993, arts. 23-24, 32
I.L.M. 1499, 1507 (1993) (stating that in limited cases, the NAALC allows for the
formation of an "Evaluation Committee of Experts").
17 If the social clause includes environmental standards, then the Panel of Experts
would include experts in this field as well.
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recommended. Fundamentally, this will reduce concerns of loss of national
sovereignty by emphasizing that the primary intent is to encourage countries to rapidly
improve their own enforcement processes to assume responsibility for upholding the
law. This will require each country to improve its laws and enforcement mechanisms
and to assume direct responsibility for enforcement of the provisions of the labor
clause. This is one of the major strategies for achieving implementation of the
European Economic Community Treaty,'8 and was also advanced as a key aspect for
the social charter proposed for Mercosur and by trade union advocates at the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC") People's Summit. This is in sharp contrast
with NAFTA, which, in the NAALC, precluded review of or changes to the domestic
labor law of the signatories.' 9
Achieving harmony among the relatively similar economies of the European
Community is significantly different from attempting to unite the Americas with the
extremely diverse levels of economic development, but harmonization should be
accepted initially as the ultimate goal. It is important to add, however, that with respect
to the issue of minimum wages, or other issues that are based on relative economic
conditions, the suggestion is not that standards be harmonized to be identical. The
issue is whether there is a minimum wage, for example, that is reasonable for the level
of economic development in the given country. In many developing countries, the
minimum wage is the prevailing wage. Therefore, for most workers, the most immediate
concern is having the minimum wage equal the liveable wage based on local economic
conditions. This should be a key issue of the harmonization discussion. Another
issue that must be addressed is whether the laws of a given country provide for
sufficient remedies and penalties to encourage compliance by employers.
A further principle of harmonization is that countries that lack the resources
and capacity to improve the enforcement of labor laws must be provided with direct
assistance from international aid organizations and developing countries to support
these activities and offset the costs of compliance. This is a form of development aid
that could lead to concrete and sustainable development benefits for working people.
Issues to Be Resolved:
1. Whoparticipaes in the hamnonzzationplanningprocess?
Certainly, representatives of the member countries should be participants, but
there should be direct participation from labor unions, NGOs, employers, and other
concerned organizations, as well as from acknowledged experts. Perhaps the Panel of
Experts could provide staff resources for the harmonization process, since the
inspections will reveal the precise issues to be addressed with harmonization.
2. How long should the harmonizaton process take?
18 See, eg., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches
to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MIcH. J. IN'L L. 987, 1001-1004 (1995).
19 See supra, note 16, at art. 3, sec. 1, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1503, 1515 (1993) (requiring that
9[e]ach Party shall promote compliance with and enforce its own labor law..., The
Labor Principles of Annex 1 specifically "do not establish common minimum standards
for [the parties'] domestic law.')
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The ultimate decision on this issue depends upon which group of countries
is involved. If the entire world is participating through a reformed WTO process, for
example, that would obviously require a much longer period than adding another
country to NAFTA. It is essential, however, to have a clear time frame with specific
steps beginning with assessing the laws that need to be improved, amending the laws,
and then fully enforcing the new laws. With respect to the FTAA and the wide
diversity of economic conditions in its member states, a significant time frame should
be envisioned. If the subject countries have already agreed to be bound by the labor
clause, then amending and implementing changes to domestic law to ensure
compliance with the labor clause should not require any major changes in the way
things are done, and therefore should not require an overly lengthy period of time. The
focus should be on designing a reasonable time period to phase in enforcement.
C. Participation in an information audit by companies operating in
more than one country of the FTAA.
There must be a firm recognition that employers, not governments,20 are
initially to blame for denying workers their rights; the government's role is to enforce
the law. A major goal for effective enforcement of a labor clause is to develop a way
to regulate the employment practices of compinies operating in the countries bound
by the labor clause. Most of the problems relating to a denial of the rights created in
the labor clause would be solved if companies respected the law. This is in sharp
contrast with the current draft of the FrAA, which like the WTO and NAFTA, focuses
its enforcement process only on member states.
In order to have a basis for monitoring the activities of companies, more
information is needed. This process can be initiated by requiring as part of the
enforcement mechanism for a labor clause, that all participating countries cooperate in
developing an annual Labor Information Audit of businesses operating in two or more
of the trade agreement countries. The audit would be conducted by independent
monitors, and would be required of any company that seeks to export or import within
the area covered by the trade agreement. The companies would be required to report
information pertaining to all of their operations, whether under their own corporate form
or through subsidiaries, joint ventures, contractors, or other business forms. The
information would be publicly available to inform governments and organizations
seeking to enforce domestic laws or the provisions of the labor clause, and would
include:
a) location,
b) total number of employees, categorized by job classification and pay grade,
c) wages paid for each job classification and/or pay grade specified by form
of payment (i.e., hourly, daily, weekly, monthly etc. or average wages
for piecework),
d) total benefits provided to all individual or groups of employees, present
unionization status of any employees specifying the name of the
union, number of represented employees, status of, and a copy of
the most recent collective bargaining agreement, affiliation of union
with any central labor body or confederation,
20 Of course governments, when acting as employers, can and do violate their own
labor laws.
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e) health and safety records, and
f) some record of employment practices that might violate the law in one or
more trade area countries.
Issues to Be Resolved:
1. Who would conduct the audits?
To ensure credibility, the audits must be performed by "independent"
auditors. Whether this includes representatives from the respective governments is
optional, but it would be desirable to improve the enforcement capacity of government
inspectors. The Panel of Experts could certainly be recruited to survey the companies
as well, but if the ILO is ultimately selected to serve as the Panel of Experts, it would
not necessarily be the ideal group to survey employers. Perhaps a body of independent
experts within each country could be appointed to focus exclusively on performing the
annual labor audit
2. How wdd campany conpliance be required?
There will have to be some commitment by the governments to mandate
company compliance as part of the FTAA. This should include a thorough audit of
each country's labor laws to clarify employer obligations under the law.
3. What is the result f a conpay is found in the audit to be violating either the labor
laws or the labor clause?
Any violation of the labor laws discovered in the audit should be reported to
the country where the violation occurred. There should be a process of monitoring to
ensure that the country has taken action to enforce the law. Violations of the labor
clause by companies are dealt with in the next two provisions.
D. Require that companies operating in more than one country of the
FTAA comply with the terms of the labor clause.
The audit described in part (C) above, is designed to develop information to
promote better compliance with labor standards. However, in order to ensure that
companies comply with the law, they should be required to abide by the terms of the
labor clause, in addition to the labor laws in the countries where they operate. This is
not a radical proposition. The OECD21 and the ILO 2 have both called for developing
codes of conduct for MNCs that incorporate similar substantive standards as the
proposed labor clause. Binding the companies to the labor clause would provide an
alternative, albeit more mandatory, mechanism for ensuring company compliance. This
provision is essential to clarify the responsibility of MNCs in participating in efforts to
improve respect for labor laws. Once harmonization occurs following completion of
part (B) above, compliance with the provisions of the labor clause would be redundant
with compliance with the labor laws.
21Organization for Economic Cooperation, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/minbrooke.pdf (2000).
22 International Labor Organization, Trioartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, at http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/english/multiq.htm
(2000).
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Issues to Be Resolved:
1. The relationshq) between obligations crealed by the labor clause and any effort to
devWop a binding code of condct.
It is important not to create conflicting obligations for the companies. The
best course would be to view codes of conduct as offering a private regulatory system
to further ensure compliance with the labor clause.
2. What is the scope of a company's responsibility? S2ould it ertend to the
subcontractor level?
Since an increasing percentage of global production is done by
subcontractors, it would seem essential to hold the buyer-company responsible for the
conditions of production for products it sells.
3. W9hat happens if a company mfuses to agree to be bound by the labor clause?
There could be a discussion about a grace period for companies that cannot
comply immediately due to the need to make comprehensive changes in the way they
operate. That could be a legitimate issue. However, for companies that simply refuse
to cooperate, the penalty should be the same as for companies that are found to have
violated the labor clause, discussed in part (E) below.
E. Remedies following a violation of the labor clause by a member
country and/or a company operating within a member country.
This, of course, is ultimately the issue that will cause resistence to
participation by governments. Whether it is the United States or Haiti, no government
wants another authority to have enforcement power over it. This provision will
necessarily be more complex. The enforcement issue should be discussed in the
context of emphasizing that the ultimate goal would be to never have to use it because
compliance will have been achieved through the harmonization process discussed in
part (B), above. Affirmative enforcement of the standards should be viewed as an
unusual and extreme occurrence. The system should create sufficient incentives to
encourage compliance so that outside enforcement can be avoided. The norm should
be that national processes will be used to uphold the fundamental rights protected by
the social standard. However, there certainly will be issues of failure to comply, and the
mechanics of an enforcement mechanism will be an integral part of the overall
provision. To facilitate discussion, suggested language will be offered to accomplish
the key points.
1. Notice of Violation
To refute the perception that the labor clause will override national authority,
it must be constantly emphasized that any penalty imposed against a participating
government would flow from a voluntary trade agreement that all member states have
agreed to abide by, that imposes substantive standards in the labor clause that each
country is already bound to through domestic labor law, or international instruments,
including ILO Conventions. The power to avoid penalties rests with the member
states' ability to avoid violations. To strongly emphasize this point, the first clause of
[Vol 2:2
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the remedy provision should require notice and opportunity to correct faults.
Suggested language is as follows:
Prior to any investigation or hearing of any sort under this or any
other provision, any complaint submitted to the Panel of Experts that
a party has violated any provision of the labor clause must be
provided to the appropriate authority of that party in writing with
any documentation. No action may be taken by the Panel of Experts,
nor any penalty imposed, nor will the allegation be considered a
violation for purposes of cumulating violations, if the party that is
the subject of the allegation addresses the allegations to the
satisfaction of the complaining party within 30 days of the provision
of notice.
2. Penalties for Failure to Correct Violations of the
Labor Clause
Given that each country will have passed, by necessity, an assessment of
compliance with the labor clause as per part (A) above, to qualify for participation in
the FTAA, there should not be too many issues of inadequate law. However, if a
country fails to remedy a violation of the labor clause, which would normally mean it
refuses to enforce its laws, there must be a system of penalties to encourage
compliance. There should be a clear recognition that normally the government does
not violate the rights protected directly, but is charged with enforcing the law with
respect to companies operating within its territory. Penalties directed at companies,
with the cooperation of the host government, should resolve most problems. The
penalties therefore should be designed to encourage enforcement. Again, this leaves
solving the problem within the firm control of the individual governments and allows
them to act to prevent any protectionist use of the labor clause. If a country ultimately
refuses to enforce its own laws as per the commitment made in accepting the labor
clause, then the remedy must be exclusion from the trade agreement and the
corresponding benefits. The following provision is an effort to accomplish these
objectives:
Any products found by the Panel of Experts to be made in violation
of any of the provisions of the labor clause shall be deemed to be
tainted products that may not be shipped within the FTAA.
Following such a finding, all member countries have the right to
immediately ban the importation of that product from the country
that was the subject of the finding. Alternatively, the countries
could impose a tariff on the product to reflect the unfair cost
advantage of producing the product in violation of the labor clause.
If it is not practical to identify within a class of products which items
were made in violation of the labor clause, all products within the
class are subject to the ban unless the producer can demonstrate
with satisfactory evidence that his or her products were not made in
violation of the labor clause.
Any party to the FTAA, or any person or organization adversely
affected by a violation of the labor clause, may bring a formal
complaint to the Panel of Experts within one year of the occurrence
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of the last act constituting a violation. In order for a country that is
a party to the agreement to bring a complaint to the Panel of Experts,
that country must itself be in full compliance with the labor clause.
The Panel of Experts, which shall develop its own rules of procedure
to be submitted for approval to the parties to the FTAA, must hold
a public hearing on all complaints and must resolve all complaints
with a written opinion within 180 days of the filing date.
Following a finding by the Panel of Experts that there was a violation
of the labor clause, the country where the violation occurred shall
immediately institute proceedings to enforce the law with respect to
the company or entity identified as denying the rights of the labor
clause. The country shall file with the Panel of Experts monthly
reports, available for public inspection, indicating steps being taken
to enforce the law. In no case shall the enforcement process at the
first level of adjudication available in the country take more than six
months to complete.
In any case in which a single company, and for purposes of the labor
clause a single company includes all subsidiaries or other entities
under its direction or control, is the subject of more than two
findings by the Panel of Experts of a violation of the same provision
of the labor clause within a one year period, whether or not the
violation occurred in the same country of the trade area, the third
violation will be deemed a systematic failure to comply with the law.
The company will be suspended from the benefits of the FTAA for
a period of one year, and all products produced by the company
within the trade area must be subject to tariff treatment by all member
countries as if they were produced outside the trade area and may
be subject to any other trade sanctions any country within the trade
area wishes to impose. Appropriate steps must be taken by member
countries to prevent transshipments of products through a non-
sanctioned company. After a one year period, the company may
apply to have the suspension lifted and must then participate in a
new audit as per part (C) above to determine whether the company
is in complete compliance with the labor clause.
In any case in which a member country is the subject of more than
two findings by the Panel of Experts of failing to enforce the same
provision of the labor clause within a one year period, whether or
not the violation concerns the same company or entity, the third
violation will be deemed a systematic failure to enforce the law and
the country will be suspended from the benefits of the FTAA,
allowing all other countries to adjust tariffs or otherwise impose
sanctions as if the subject country was not a party to the trade
agreement. This penalty will also apply in any case in which a
country fails to comply with any of the affirmative requirements of
this enforcement provision to provide information to the Panel of
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Experts or otherwise cooperate in obtaining enforcement of the labor
clause. If the violations are specific to a particular sector of the
economy, the Panel of Experts may opt to impose the penalty only
with respect to that sector. After a one year period, the country may
reapply for membership through the provisions of part (A) above.
Issues to Be Resolved:
All of the issues addressed in the recommended language should be
thoroughly debated to identify the best options. Some general explanation may be
helpful in focusing the discussion. The emphasis is on respecting national sovereignty
by acknowledging that countries must have the primary responsibility for enforcing
laws within their territory, and the labor clause serves as a backup device, as well as a
monitoring instrument. There are significant opportunities for countries to avoid
penalties, first by requiring notice and an opportunity to correct, then by permitting up
to two violations before permitting penalties for systematic violations, assuming the
country otherwise cooperates in resolving the first two violations. Whether this
standard should be higher or lower is certainly something that should be thoroughly
debated. Further, penalties should be focused on the removal of trade benefits with the
possibility of banning the tainted products from trade. The permissible remedies
should be the focus of special attention in discussions. There certainly are other
options, including monetary fines. A key objective is to create a reasonable mechanism
that would not be viewed as too onerous by countries. It seems fair that the trade
agreement provides specific benefits if a country or company complies with the
provisions, including the labor clause, and they lose those benefits if they violate the
provisions. Likewise, with respect to companies, penalties are designed to achieve
compliance and provide an incentive to cooperate to avoid suffering loss of market
access.
IV. Conclusion
There are no doubt many approaches to devising an enforceable labor clause
for the FTAA that would achieve the objective of using trade as a vehicle to improve
conditions for workers. The approach outlined above is one effort to raise issues that
are being neglected in the current FTAA discussions. In previous NAFTA
negotiations, labor and environmental issues were ignored, and later had to be tacked
on, for political reasons, as "side agreements." Little has been learned by the
commercial and political interests involved in the FTAA negotiations if they attempt
again to force upon the people of the FTAA countries an agreement that ignores the
issues that are most important to the vast majority of the people. This time the
opposition is much better organized and more informed about the issues. There will be
no FTAA unless the agreement recognizes that labor rights and environmental
protections are central to any trading system that purports to be operating for the
benefit of all people, not just powerful commercial interests. Without regulation, these
forces could turn back the clock and operate in the Americas as they used to operate
in the United States a century ago.
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APPENDIX
CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (IL0)
RATIED BY COUNTRIES IN THE AMERICAS
Central America
Country Ratified
Beli05COOS, CO7. COOS, Co1. COI 1, C012, CO6 C019, C022, C026, C029, C042. COSS,
C081, C087, COSS. C089, C094, C095. C097, C09g, C099, CIOI, C105, CO&, C115
Costa Rica COO1. COO8, COI1, C014, C0]6, C026, C029, CO45, COSI, C087, COSS, C089, C090,
C092, C094, C095, C096, C09. C099, CI00, Cl 01, C 102, C 05, C106, C107, C iI.
C11I ZCI 13, C1 14, CI 17, C120, C122, C127, Cl 29, C 130, C131, C134, C135, C137,
C138, C141, C144, C145, C147, C148, Ct50, C159, C169
El Salvador C012, CIO4, C105, C107, C159, C160
Guatemala COO, COO. COI1, CO3, C014, C015, 016, C019, C026, C029, C030, C045, COSO,
COS, 0159, 0062, C063, C064, C065, C077, C078, C079, COSO, COS1. C086, C087,
COSS. C289, C090, C094, C095, C096, C097, C098, C099, CI00, CIOI, CIO3, C104,
COS, C106. CI08 Clo9, CI09 .10, Cl 1 12, C1 13, C114, C1 16, Cl 17, CI1S, C1 19,
C120, CI22, C124, C127, C129, C131, C13. C141, C144, C156, C159, CI60, Cb61,
C162, C167
Honduras C014, C027, C029, C032, C042, C045, C062, C078, C082 COS7, C095, CD9. CiOO,
Cl05. Clo6, CIOS, CII1, C1]6, C122, C138
Nicaragua C001, CO02 CO03, C004, CI05, CoO6, C107, COOS, COO9, Cl 10, COI1, C012, C013,
C014. Col5, C016, C017, CoI8, C2019, C020, C021, C022, C023, C024, Co25. C026
C027, C028. Co29, C030, C045, 0163, C077, C075, C0S7, .COgS 095, C09, C10 ,
Cl05. Cl 10, Ci 11, Cl 15, Cl 17, CI 19, C122, C127, C131, C135, C136. C137, C138,
C139, CI40, C141. C142, C144, C146
Panama Co03, CO8 3009, C010, C011, CO12, 0113, C015, C016, C017, 019, C020, C021,
Co2Z 0223. C2d, C027, Co29, C030, 032, C042, C043, C045. C052, 0053, Co55,
C056, COS, C0163, C064, C065, C068. CodS, C071, C073, C074, C077, C078, 00
0081, C086, C087, C0SS. C 09, C 09 Cog4, C095. C096, CO98, CIOO, C104, C105,
C107. CIS. Cl 10,.C]I CI 12, CI 13, Cl 14, C116. Cl 17, C1 19, C120, C122. C123,




Canada COOl, C007, COOS, C014, 015, C016, C022, 026, C027, 032, C045, COSS, C063. COdS. C069,
C073, C074, COSO C087. 0OS, CIOO, C105, Cl08, CI 11, C116, C122, C147, C162
Mexico C006, C007, COOS, C009, Co1l, Co12 0113, Co14, C016, 017, C09, C021, C022 C023. C026,
C027, C029, C030. C032, C034, C042. C043, C045, C046, C049, C052 Co53, C054, COSt, 056,
COSS, C062, C063, COSO, C07, C090, C095, C06, C099. CIOO C 102, Cl05, C106, C107, Cl08,
C109, CI10, CI I1, C I2. Cl It, C116, CI I., C20, C123, CI24, C131, C134, C135 C140, C141,
C142, C144, CISO, C152. C153, C155, C160. C61, C163. C164, Cl66, C167, C169, C170, C172,
C173
United States C053, C054, 055, COS7, C05, 074, C00, C105, C144, C147, Cl60
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South America
Coutry Ratified
Argentina C001, C002 C003, C004, C005. C006, CO07, C00,009, C00,10 C01 , C012, C013, C04, C015, C016,
C017, 018, C019, C02o, C021, C022, C023, 026, C027, C029, 030, C031, C032. C033, C034, 0035,
X036, 041. C042,C045,0050, 0052, C053, C0580068, C071, C073, C077, C07& C079, CO0, C081,
C087, C088, C090, C095, C098, COO, 005, C107, C 11, C115, C124, C129, C139, C142., C44, C151,
C154. C156, C159
Bolivia C001, C005, C014, C017, C019, C020, 026, C030, C042, C045, C077, C078, C081, C097, C088, C089,
C090, 095. C096, C098, CI00 CO102, C103, C105, C0, C107, C11], C116, C 1 17 , C1 1 8 , C12 , C 12 1,
C122, C123. C124, C12, C129. C130, C131, C136, C160, C162, C169
Brazil CO0 0 3, C004, C.005, 006 CO07, 0011, C012, C014, C016, C019, C02, C022, C026 C029, C041. C042,
0045, C052, 053, C058 080, 081, 088, C089, C091, C09 0093, C094, C095, C096, C097, C098,
C099, C100 CI01, CI2 C103, C04, CI05,106, C017, C018, C109, C110, Cl 11, C1 13, C 15, C16,
C117, C118, l 19, C20,C122, C124, C125, C12, C127. C131, C133, C135, C136, C137, C] 39, C140,
C141, C142, C144, C145, C347, C48, C152, C154, C155, C159, C160, C161. C162, C168
Chile C001, C002, C003, C004, C5, C006, 007, C008, 0O9.C010.011, 012, C013, C014, C015, 0016,
C017. C018, C019, C020. C022, 024, C025, 026, C027, C029, 030, C032, C034. C035, C036, C037,
C038, 0042, C045. C063, C080 C00, 103, C 11, C 15, C122, C 27, C136, C144, C156, C159. C162
Colombia C001.0 002, C3, C004, 0005, C006, 007, C008, C009, 0010, C011, 0012, C013. C014,0015, 0016,
0017, 018., C019, C02D, C021, 0022, C023, C024, C025, C026,0029, C030, C052, C062, C080, C081,
C087, C088, C095, C09&, C099, C00, C01, C104, C105, C06 107, Cl 11, C116, C129, C136, 0159,
C160,167.C169,0170
Ecuador 0002 C011, C024, C026, C029, C035, 0037,0 039,0C04503077, C078,,081. 0086, C087.0088, C095.
0097, C098. C100, C101. C10, C103 C104, C105. C106. C107. C110 0 11 112, C 1130 C114, C115,
C116, C117, C118, C119, C120 C121. C122 C123, C124. C127, C128, C130. C131, C136 C139, C141,
C142, C144, 148, C149, C152, C153, C159, C162
Equatorial Guinea Cool, C014, C030, C100, C103, C138
Guyana CO0,0005, C007, C010, C011, C012, 015, C019, 026, C029, 042, C045, C050, C064, C065, 081,
C086, 087, C094, C095, 097, C09, C0, C105, C108, CI 11. C1 15, C129, C131, C135. C137. C137,
C139. C140, C141, C142 C144. C149, C150, C151
Paraguay C001, C011, C014, 0026, 029, C03,052, C49 C060, Col7.070, C079, C081, C087. C089, C090,
C095, C098, C099, C0, C1010, C .OS, C06, C107, C 11, C115, C116, C117, C119, C120, C122, C123,
C124,C159,C169
Peru Cool, C004, C008, C009, 010, COI1.0 12, C014, C019. 0020,0023, 024. C025, C026, C027, C029,
032, C035. C036, C037, C038, 039, C040, C044, C045, C052, 053, 55, C056, C058, C059, C062,
C067. C068, C069, C070, C071, C073 C077, C078, C079, C080, 081, C087, C088, C090, C098, C099,
C100.1 CO, C102, CI5, C016 C107, C111, C112 C113, C114, C122, C139, C151, C152, C156, C159,
C169
Surimname C011, C013. C014, C017, C019 C027, 0029 C041, C042, C062, 081, C087, C088, C094, C095, C096,
C01. C,105, C106. C112, C18, C122, C135, C144, C150. C151
Uruguay o001. C002 C003, C004.0 C 5. 006, C007. COO& C009, C010, C011, C01, C013. C04, C01. C016,
017, C018, C019. C020.021, 0022 C023, C024,025, C026, 0027, C030,0C032 C033, C042 C043.
C045. C052, C054, C05 ,059, C060. C062 C063.0067, 0073,0C077. C078, C079, C080. 081, C087,
01089, C090, C093, C094, C095, C096, C097, C098, C099, CIO0. C0]0, C103, CI05, C106, C108, C110,
C0 11, C112, C13, C114, C115. C116, C 18 C119, C121, C122, C128, C129, C130, C131, C132, C133,
C134, C136, C137, C138 C139, C141, C144, C148, C149, C150, C151, C153, C154, C155, C156, C159,
C161
Venezuela c001, 002,c003,C004,CO05.0006.C0007,011, 013C014C019,C021, C022,C026,C027,C029,
0041, C045, C080, C081,0C0870088, C095, C097. C09 C0, C102, C103, C105, C1. C116, C117,
C118,C120,C121,C122,C127 C]28,C130,C138, 0139,C.140.C41.C 142, C 143.C144,C149,C150,
C153,C155,C156, 0158
